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Abstract
We study the effect of direct democracy on local taxation. Our setting is the
German federal state of Bavaria, where in 1995 a state-wide referendum introduced
the possibility to initiate direct democratic legislation into the local government
code. Relying on a sample of all Bavarian municipalities over the period 1980-2011,
we hypothesize that complementing a representative form of government with direct
democratic elements leads to (i) higher local tax rates and (ii) a shift of the local tax
mix from taxes with broader (property taxes) to taxes with narrower bases (business
taxes). For identification, we implement selection on observables and difference-in-
discontinuity designs. Our results show that both actual direct democratic activity
– measured by the number of initiatives – and the ease with which direct democratic
legislation can be implemented – measured by signature and quorum requirements
– increase local tax rates and shift the tax mix toward taxes with narrower bases.
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1 Introduction
Since the 1970s, direct democratic institutions have been identified as potential determi-
nants of budgetary outcomes. The underlying argument is that if voters have the right
to bypass parliamentary representatives through direct legislation, the influence of the
median voter relative to that of the legislative agenda setter should grow (Pommerehne,
1978; Romer and Rosenthal, 1979). So far this reasoning has been primarily tested em-
pirically with respect to public expenditures and debt.1 On the other hand, the effect
of direct democracy on taxation in general and the tax structure in particular, has been
largely neglected. To our knowledge, there are only two exceptions: Matsusaka’s (2005)
study on the impact of voter initiated legislation in US states covers both the expendi-
ture and revenue sides of state budgets. His results suggest that direct democracy leads
to higher user charges and lower share of taxes in state revenues. Recently, Feld and
Schaltegger (2012) have arrived at similar results for Swiss cantons: cantons where fi-
nancial referenda are mandatory rely more on user fees than cantons where referenda are
optional.
While the results in these studies are suggestive, their results rely ultimately on a selec-
tion on observables approach. Hence, it can be questioned whether they have identified
a causal effect. In particular, the importance of direct democracy could be systemati-
cally related to tax pressure or be a consequence of an unobserved variable like citizen’s
fiscal preferences (Funk and Gathmann, 2013). Our study addresses this gap in the lit-
erature. It is the first analysis of the role of direct democracy in shaping tax policies
that relies on a credible identification strategy.2 For identification, we exploit the 1995
institutional reform of adopting direct democratic legislation at the local level in the Ger-
man state of Bavaria to test whether the right of initiatives has had an effect on a) the
level of municipal taxation (i.e. local tax rates), and b) on the choice between different
1For a survey of the early literature, see Kirchga¨ssner (2000), for more recent studies, see Feld and
Matsusaka (2003); Funk and Gathmann (2011, 2013); Asatryan et al. (2013).
2In contrast, a few studies exist which employ convincing identifications strategies to analyze the
link between direct democracy and local expenditures (Asatryan et al., 2013; Hinnerich and Pettersson-
Lidbom, 2012).
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municipal tax instruments (i.e. local tax-mix). More specifically, we exploit a combina-
tion of the 1995 direct democracy reform together with the size dependent population
thresholds on the number of signature and quorum requirements which allows designing
a quasi-experimental setup.
With its differentiated analysis for different tax instruments, our study also contributes
to the growing literature on the political economy of the observable tax structure in
democracies. In the context of this literature, our study is the first to extend the dis-
cussion on the political economy of the local tax-mix to the case of German cooperative
federalism, which offers an interesting comparison against the existing Swiss and US
evidence.
In this literature’s underlying theory, the observable tax mix is modeled as the outcome
of an optimization process (Hettich and Winer, 1984, 1988, 1999). In the Hettich-Winer-
model of representative democracy, self-interested politicians and political parties are
maximizing electoral support by minimizing the expected vote losses for collecting any
given amount of budget revenue. This suggests that in the equilibrium the decision maker
will choose tax rates to equalize the marginal vote losses per unit of taxed revenue across
different tax sources. The work by Hettich and Winer has initiated a large body of
empirical literature on the political economy of tax structure on the local (e.g. Inman
(1989); Gilla and Haurin (2001); Ashworth et al. (2006); Fiva and Rattso (2007); Geys
and Revelli (2009); Feld et al. (2010)) as well as national levels (e.g. Winer and Hettich
(1991); Volkerink and de Haan (1999); Ashworth and Heyndels (2001, 2002); Kenny and
Winer (2006); Aidt and Jensen (2009a,b); Profeta et al. (2013)).
Several general factors of relevance for the preferred tax mix have been identified and
offer a helpful starting point to reflect on the impact of direct democracy on equilibrium
tax policies (Hettich and Winer, 1984; Kenny and Winer, 2006): For example, the rela-
tive size of tax bases matters since a larger tax base reduces the political resistance for
raising an additional unit of revenue from the respective tax. In our context, another
important factor determining the equilibrium tax mix is the link between the tax burden
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imposed on voters and the resulting opposition against representative legislators. Under
representative democracy, political opposition materializes through expected vote losses
in the next election. This link could be influenced, for example, by a low visibility of taxes
or by shifting the burden of tax to non-voters such as taxpayers in other jurisdictions, to
a higher level of government (Hettich and Winer, 1984) or to taxpayers without voting
rights (Aidt and Jensen, 2009a). The implementation of direct democracy substantially
widens the scope of voters for effective opposition. Citizens now command over an addi-
tional sanction beyond the threat of punishment in the next (possibly distant) election.
In contrast to the right of choosing the legislator once for a full legislative term, this
sanction can be used frequently over the whole term. Instead of voting on a candidate’s
or party’s policy package announced for the coming legislative period voters can decide
on single policy issues continuously.
The general expectation that initiatives strengthen the median voter’s power to influ-
ence budgetary outcomes should obviously also hold for the tax mix. Voters can make
use of the additional channel of opposition to correct the tax mix towards the preferred
structure. Importantly in the institutional context of Germany, this power shift is not
necessarily conditional on the existence of comprehensive referenda power covering tax
laws directly. Even if – as it is the case for German municipalities – voter initiatives must
not relate to the budget and hence taxation immediately (“fiscal-taboo”) they could be
used to sanction a non-preferred tax mix. Voter initiatives impact on collective decisions
through different channels (Matsusaka, 1995): They limit the leeway of legislators for vote
trading among elected representatives, they reduce committee agenda setting power, they
offer a better source of information on voter preferences and they can function as control
device preventing legislator shirking or caring for special interest groups. Hence, with
initiatives and referenda voters command over a weapon to hit back on spending projects
if they perceive the tax mix as inappropriate. This is potentially costly for representative
politicians since they are decreasingly able to realize political benefits on the spending
side through financing favours for special interest groups or administrative slack. To limit
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these costs, legislators might be forced to stronger take account of voter preferences for
the tax side.
In the institutional context of German municipalities this implies a clear hypothesis.
Municipalities have tax setting autonomy with respect both to property taxes on real es-
tates and a trade tax imposed on the business sector above a certain threshold. Although
the economic incidence of both taxes is unclear (Fuest et al., 2013), the perceived tax
burden is strongly asymmetric: the property taxes have a wide coverage while the trade
tax imposes a visible burden only on a very small group of the electorate. Hence, we hy-
pothesize that direct democracy with its reduced political influence of minority interest
groups will shift the tax mix away from property taxes (and the median voters) towards
business taxes (and the taxation of minorities).
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we summarize the German institutional
setting and the Bavarian institutions of direct democracy. In subsequent Section 3 we
describe the data and develop our identification strategy. Section 4 presents our empirical
findings and performs several robustness checks, followed by conclusions in Section 5.
2 Institutional Details
2.1 Fiscal institutions in Bavaria
As in all German states, municipalities in Bavaria are responsible for the provision of
important public goods to citizens such as kindergartens, elementary schools, utility
and infrastructure facilities, local streets, athletic areas and basic health care. Total
annual expenditure for an average municipality amounted to around 2,200 Euros per
capita in 2011. This spending is partly financed through tax revenue (around 40% of
revenue), while the rest depends on fees, property income or payments through both block
and special purpose grants received mainly from the state of Bavaria (and to a smaller
extent from the federal level, for details see Bayerisches Staatsministerium der Finanzen
(2013)). As typical for Germany’s cooperative federalism, these payments have a strongly
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equalizing character and benefit particularly those municipalities with a poor revenue
situation. As a consequence, those municipalities that successfully generate economic
growth and tax revenues are confronted with an implicit tax through the reduction of
received grants.
On the taxation side, some 44% of revenue comes from shared taxes (Table 1). Mu-
nicipalities receive predefined shares of VAT and income taxes without any autonomy
to set e.g. surcharges on these country-wide taxes. The rest of tax revenue is, however,
under local discretion. This autonomous revenue is generated through two sources: prop-
erty taxes on land and property (“Grundsteuer A and B”)3 and tax on local businesses
(“Gewerbesteuer”, also called the trade tax). For these three taxes, the tax bases are uni-
formly defined nationwide, but municipalities are free to decide the tax rate through the
definition of a tax multiplier (“Hebesatz”), which is applied to the federal rate (“Steuer-
messzahl”) fixed for all municipalities by the central government.4
Thus, we have a system of fiscal federalism with both extensive revenue sharing and
far-reaching equalization of differences in the jurisdictions’ financial capacities, which
imply complex interactions between different government layers. The clear-cut distinc-
tion between own source revenue (with full authority over deciding the policy) and non-
discretionary revenue, however, makes this institutional setting particularly attractive for
for research question. There are two main reasons. First, with partial autonomy munic-
ipalities are left with a few policy tools (e.g. property and business tax rates), which
are both clearly observable and contain a good deal of variation across towns. Thus it is
easy to test the governments’ fiscal reaction to certain political phenomena (e.g. whether
direct democracy affects the level of taxation). Second, as discussed in the introduction,
the perceived tax burden of the (only) two types of taxes that generate own revenues are
3As presented in Table 1, municipalities set two different multipliers on agricultural land (rate A)
and all other property (rate B) generating about 1% and 17% of local autonomous revenue respectively.
Since the tax on agricultural land is only a marginal source of funding, we will henceforth concentrate
only on tax rate B and refer to it as the property tax.
4The nationwide rate for the local business tax is 3.5% (5% before 2008 (Fossen and Bach, 2008))
which is then multiplied by the locally set multiplier, for our sample, ranging from 230% to 600%.
Likewise for the property taxes, a multiplier of up to 800% is applied to a federally set rate of 0.3-1%
depending on property type and population size.
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clearly asymmetric: the property tax has a wide coverage while the business tax (visibly)
imposes a burden on a fairly small group of the electorate.5 Thus it is feasible to test not
only the absolute (i.e. level of taxes), but also the relative effect (i.e. structure of taxes)
of direct democracy on taxation.
The local business tax (or equivalently: local trade tax) is the most important profit tax
in Germany generating more than 50% of total business tax revenue (Fuest et al., 2013).
Although municipalities cannot keep the full revenues (they have to transfer a share from
their trade tax proceeds to state and central government, called “Gewerbesteuerum-
lage”), the remaining amount is still the most significant source of autonomous revenue
for municipalities generating more than half of their tax revenue on average (Table 1).
Regarding its incidence, the business tax applies to both corporate and non-corporate
firms. In practice, however, sole proprietors and partners of unincorporated firms benefit
from a tax-free basic allowance. Moreover, since 2001 these firms are allowed to credit
the local business tax liability up to a certain threshold against their personal income
tax liability (Fossen and Bach, 2008). Additionally, certain liberal professions such as
physicians, lawyers, architects, journalists, as well as most firms in agricultural and pub-
lic sectors are exempt from the local business tax. Therefore, the local business tax is a
tax mainly on corporations arguably with a perceived burden only on a very small group
of voters (e.g. business owners).
In contrast, the (non-agricultural) property tax has a much wider coverage as this is
paid either by property owners or are directly passed over to the tenants via operating
costs (Bundesministerium der Justiz, 2004), and, thus, have a higher visibility for voters.
As presented in Table 1, the property tax generates about 17% of local autonomous
revenue.
5While the formal incidence of a tax is not informative on the economic incidence the former is
nevertheless highly relevant for voter awareness for the burden of a tax.
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2.2 Direct democratic institutions
In 1990s most German states went through a series of reforms introducing elements of
direct democracy at the local level. These reforms were implemented independently from
each other, and, thus, contained a substantial degree of variation across states. A remark-
able case among these state-level reforms was the direct democratic reform in Bavaria.6
Rather than a change imposed by politicians (as in most other states), here the reform
came bottom-up through the right of the citizen initiative at the state level. Despite
significant barriers, a popular mobilization in 1995 collected nearly 1.2 million signa-
tures comfortably passing the requirements to initiate a state-wide referendum (around
900,000 signatures (10% threshold) were to be collected in two weeks time) demanding
direct democracy at the local level. The initiative was implemented as a referendum later
that year collecting 57.8% “Yes” votes (Verhulst and Nijeboer, 2008).
Due to their strong roots, the Bavarian direct democratic institutions turned out to
the most comprehensive ones among German states both in terms of their legislative
openness (Asatryan, 2014) and their exhaustive usage in practice (Figure 1). This is the
main reason for us to concentrate on Bavarian municipalities.
The 1995 referendum introduced Article 18 to the Municipal Law of the Free State of
Bavaria (“Gemeindeordnung fu¨r den Freistaat Bayern”) which defines the direct demo-
cratic legislation at the municipal level: Voters can launch a citizen-initiative (“Bu¨rg-
erbegehren“) for a referendum (“Bu¨rgerentscheid”) with respect to an issue within the
competencies of the municipality. Initiatives are not allowed to question the internal
organization of the municipal administration, competencies exclusively granted to the
mayor by law, the legal affairs of municipal council members, the mayor and municipal
employees, and the budget bylaws (i.e. the fiscal-taboo). An initiative successfully leads
to a referendum if it is supported by a sufficient number of signatures from municipal
residents. These signature requirements depend on the population size of the munici-
6The discussion of Bavarian reforms is based on Asatryan et al. (2013). See Asatryan (2014) for a
discussion of local-level direct democratic institutions across all German states.
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pality, and Bavaria is the only state with no time limit for signature collection. Within
a month after submitting the application for a referendum, the municipal council has
to decide whether the conditions for a lawful referendum are fulfilled. In this case, the
referendum has to be conducted no later than three months after the council decision and
is implemented under the will of the simple majority. In addition to the citizen-initiative,
Bavarian law also allows for the council-initiative (“Ratsreferendum”), which is a refer-
endum called by city councils (on average about a tenth of all initiatives). It is important
to point out here that an approved referendum has the legal effects of a municipal council
decision; it can be reversed only with another referendum on the same question within a
year from the first referendum. Thus, the introduction of direct democracy in Bavarian
municipalities in 1995 enabled citizens to conditionally substitute the legislative functions
of elected municipal council members.
Subsequent to its establishment, local direct democracy flourished in Bavaria and par-
ticularly in the first years, when between 1995 and 1999 more than 1,000 initiatives had
taken place in all of the 2099 Bavarian municipalities (Figure 2 shows the annual evo-
lution of initiatives and referenda in Bavaria). This activity was significantly dampened
after quorum requirements were introduced to the law in 1999.7 The observation that
higher signature or quorum requirements reduce the intensity of direct democratic con-
trol is crucial for our identification strategy developed below. Such evidence that higher
institutional requirements strongly reduce the number of popular initiatives over all Ger-
man states is presented by Asatryan (2014). Nevertheless, in most years since then more
than one hundred municipal initiatives take place every year. Overall, in the post-reform
period, between 1995 and 2011, there have been around 2500 initiatives in all Bavarian
municipalities roughly half of them reaching to the polls as referenda.
7Initially, this quorum requirement did not exist. The participation rate in referenda was consistently
lower than municipal elections (Scarrow, 1999). This observation may explain why the Constitutional
Court of Bavaria ruled the lacking quorum requirement as unconstitutional so that the Bavarian state
parliament had to adjust the Municipalities Law accordingly. The new quorum requirement took effect
from 1 April 1999 onwards. Like the signature requirement, the quorum requirement depends on the
size of the municipality (Table 4 summarizes the size dependent signature and quorum requirements).
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3 Data and Identification
The sample consists of a balanced panel of the universe of 2099 Bavarian municipali-
ties for the period between 1980 and 2011. The main fiscal variables of interest are the
multipliers on the two types of local property taxes and the multiplier on local business
tax as discussed in Section 2. We complement these budgetary statistics with data on
direct democratic activity in Bavarian municipalities, that is detailed data (among other
including the date, location, topic, type, and result) on all of the 2437 initiatives and
1303 referenda which took place in Bavaria since the 1995 reform (and until 2011, the
last point of observation in our dataset). Additionally, a standard set of control variables
is collected to control for demographic (total population and share of working age popu-
lation), political (municipal election dummy and ideological differences at local councils)
and economic (share of agricultural and mining areas) factors. Since the dependent vari-
ables are the two locally set tax rates, we also want to control for their relative tax bases.
Thus we correspondingly include variables capturing the number of residential buildings
per km2 and the share of commercial area in total municipal area.8
Following Asatryan et al. (2013) we specify a two-way approach. We start by simply
studying the relation between taxes and observed direct democratic activity, and, then
extend the approach to a more convincing quasi-experimental identification. The first
“selection-on-observables” type of model takes the following form:
yit = α + β1 ·Rit + β2 · Cit + µi + ηt + it, (1)
where y is the tax variable of interest, R is a dummy variable indicating whether a
referendum has taken place in municipality i in year t, C is the set of control variables
specified above, µ and η are town and year fixed effects, and  is the error term. We
discuss the results from this selection on observables approach in Section 4.1.
8Table 2 provides the basic statistics of the variables used in the analysis. Additionally, the last
two columns of Table 4 present the variation in tax rates and the distribution of towns by population
categories classified according to the thresholds in signature and quorum requirements.
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One problematic aspect of the selection on observable approaches is possible endo-
geneity. We therefore shift in a second step the focus from observed direct democratic
activity to the underlying legislation. This shift of focus has a number of advantages.
First, an emphasis on direct democratic legislation – the ease with which initiatives can
be launched – rather than observed activity, allows us to employ a quasi-experimental
empirical strategy.
Second, relying on observed initiatives or referenda captures the implications of direct
democracy for local taxation only imperfectly. When legislation is more permissive with
respect to launch an initiative, local politicians might anticipate more direct democratic
activity if they choose tax rates that deviate too much from the median voter’s prefer-
ences, and therefore comply with her preferences from the outset. Hence, we are likely to
underestimate the causal effect of direct democracy if we consider only observed direct
democratic activity. To uncover the full causal effect, we need to study the underly-
ing legislative rules that determine the ease with which initiatives or referenda can be
launched.
To address the possible endogeneity between taxation and direct democratic activity,
we exploit the fact that both signature and quorum requirements decrease discontinu-
ously at certain population thresholds (Table 4), which implies that the causal effect of
direct democracy on taxation can be established by means of a regression discontinuity
design (Thistlewaite and Campbell, 1960; Imbens and Lemieux, 2008). The idea behind
this identification strategy is that there is some degree of randomness in whether mu-
nicipalities have population sizes just above or just below a given threshold. Allocation
of the treatment – more liberal direct democratic institutions – to municipalities should
therefore be essentially random in close neighborhoods of a given threshold. This local
randomization implies that municipalities with population sizes just above the thresh-
old (“treatment”) will have more liberal direct democratic institutions than those below
(“control group”) even though both groups of municipalities should otherwise be on av-
erage identical.
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An important requirement for such identification is that only direct democratic institu-
tions should change at the thresholds. If other simultaneous discontinuities exist, then it
would be impossible to identify the sole effect of direct democracy, because the treatment
variable would also capture the effect of these other discontinuities. Our institutional
context violates this assumption. As discussed by Egger and Ko¨thenbu¨rger (2010) and
Ade and Freier (2011), there exist a number of additional institutions that change at
these thresholds, such as the size of the local council, wages of elected civil servants,
status of the municipality (implying changes in expenditure and revenue duties), certain
features of the horizontal fiscal equalization system, etc.9
Therefore, a simple RDD is unlikely to reveal the isolated causal effect of direct democ-
racy but rather a confounded impact of several of the above factors varying with popula-
tion size. To address this problem we exploit the fact that direct democracy was only in-
troduced in 1995 in Bavaria whereas the above-mentioned population thresholds remained
constant in the period under consideration. There is hence a pre- and post-treatment
period. We use this over-time variation in direct democracy by studying whether the
effect of the discontinuity on taxation differs between the pre- and post-reform periods.
A formal treatment of this difference-in-discontinuity (diff-in-disc) approach and an
application using Italian municipalities is available in Grembi et al. (2012). In our setting,
the diff-in-disc model can be formulated as:
yit = α+β1 ·Dit ·Ti+β2 ·Dit+β3 ·Ti+β4 ·f(np)+β5 ·Dit ·g(np)+ηt+it if |np| < wb, (2)
where the dependent variable y is the tax variable of interest as before; D is a dummy
variable that is 1 if (normalized) municipal population size is above a given threshold;10 T
is a dummy variable that equals 1 starting from the year 1995 (the introduction of direct
9There are a few additional size-dependent rules of more minor importance or ones that apply to
towns with less than 10,000 inhabitants, which will not affect our results. For a detailed discussion see
Ade and Freier (2011).
10Note that, when calculating the treatment dummy, the population numbers are taken from the
previous year of the last election, since by Bavarian law population figures to be adopted in legal affairs
of municipalities are those at six months prior to the last municipal elections.
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democracy); f(np) and g(np) are polynomials of (normalized) municipal population size11
that, respectively, control for all continuous effects of municipal population on fiscal policy
and allow for heterogeneous effects to the left and right of the thresholds; and wb is the
bandwidth of the window. Following Egger and Ko¨thenbu¨rger (2010), we analyze all
thresholds simultaneously by centering the data around a single 0 threshold and hence
normalize municipal population size accordingly.12 Regarding the choice of the bandwidth
size wb, there is a trade-off between reducing bias and increasing efficiency. On one
hand, limiting the sample to observations very close to the thresholds reduces bias as
“treatment” and “control” municipalities are identical in expectation, however with the
risk that results will be subject to significant sampling variability. On the other hand, as
the window sizes and hence the number of observations increase, the estimates become
more efficient, this time, with the risk of violating the assumption that other than the
signature and quorum requirement the municipalities are otherwise identical. Equation
2 is therefore estimated along different windows, w, of normalized population size.13
Finally, an important requirement for a valid RDD is that municipalities should not
have been able to selectively sort around the thresholds (Lee, 2008) by manipulating
the population statistics (Ade and Freier, 2011). Population sizes are calculated by the
state-level statistical office (outside of the control of municipal officials), however there
might be some leeway through particular municipal (dis)incentives set for new residents to
register or moving residents to unregister. Asatryan et al. (2013) tests this assumption by
comparing the densities of municipal population sizes at the thresholds. These population
11In all baseline regressions we use polynomial of up to the fourth degree. In Section 4.2.4 we test the
robustness of our results to the inclusion of other degrees of polynomials.
12More formally, the RDD dummy is defined as:
Dit =
{
1, if ln(Nit/Nd) > 0
0, if ln(Nit/Nd) ≤ 0
whereNit is the population size andNd are the population thresholds specified by columns 2 (for signature
requirements) and 3 (for quorum requirements) of Table 4, which define the normalized population:
np = ln(Nit/Nd).
13We specify 6 different bandwidths ranging from 1% to 30% of (normalized) population size on each
side of the (normalized) threshold. For summary statistics on the treatment dummy for each of the
bandwidths see the bottom six rows of Table 2.
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histograms do not provide evidence of selective sorting. However serious this problem is,
violation of the standard no-manipulation assumption is less problematic in our diff-in-
disc than in other settings as we rely on differences in the effect of the threshold between
the pre- and post-treatment period. As long as those municipal characteristics that
allow municipalities to manipulate population sizes are time-constant, we will be able to
consistently estimate the treatment effect even if there is manipulation. Asatryan et al.
(2013) provides a formal test on the time-consistency of such (possible) manipulation with
a modified version of McCrary (2008) plots. The results suggest that neither incentives
nor ability for manipulation have significantly changed from the pre- to the post-treatment
period.
4 Results
4.1 Selection-on-Observables Approach
Table 3 collects the results for Equation 1. This equation relates observed direct demo-
cratic activity – whether a referendum was held in a municipality – to the (log of) two
local tax rates. We study both immediate effects, and delayed effects by lagging the
referendum dummy up to two years. In order to allow comparisons across tax rates,
we report standardized beta coefficients.14 Standard errors are two-way clustered at the
municipality-year and municipality-initiative level.15
For the (non-agricultural) property tax (Columns 1-4 of of Table 3), the estimated
effects of referenda are consistently positive and in almost all models highly significant.
In Columns 5-8, we report the results for the business tax rate. We again observe that
14Standardized beta coefficients show the amount of standard deviations change in the dependent
variable per standard deviation change in the regressor.
15For those town-year combinations that have hosted more than one initiative a year we introduce
additional rows to capture the extra information coming from these multiple initiatives. We therefore
cluster the errors at the municipality-initiative level to account for the resulting bias. Note that this
technique is used only in the selection-on-observables approach, while in the RDD setup the lowest unit
of observation is municipality-year.
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more direct democratic activity leads to higher tax rates. The coefficient is consistently
significant. Its magnitude is noticeably larger than in those for the property tax.
Overall, these results indicate that direct democracy increases local tax rates. They
also indicate that the taxes with narrower bases – in particular the business tax – increase
more than taxes with broader bases – in particular the property tax. The differences in
beta coefficients are quite substantial too. However, as discussed above, the evidence
based on a selection on observable approach, while suggestive, is in or setting subject to
endogeneity problems. We therefore revisit in the next section the link between direct
democracy and local tax rates with a quasi-experimental methodology.
4.2 Quasi-experimental analysis
While we analyzed the link between observed direct democratic activity and local tax
rates in the previous section, we shift in this section the focus to the underlying direct
democratic legislation to implement a diff-in-disc design. We first offer some graphical
evidence using discontinuity plots and then discuss the regression results.
4.2.1 Graphical Evidence
The diff-in-disc plots in Figure 3 are constructed by dividing normalized population size
into bins of width 0.01. We then average the outcome variable – each of the two tax rates
– within each bin separately for the pre- and post-treatment periods, and then difference
the averages. The differenced averages are plotted in the figure. We also provide separate
local polynomial plots of the differenced average against normalized population size to
the left- and right of the normalized thresholds, using a bandwidth of 0.5, a cubic degree,
and a rectangular kernel. If more permissive direct democratic legislation had a positive
effect on tax rates, the effect of the normalized threshold should be larger in the post-
than in the pre-treatment period, and hence the differenced averages should display a
positive discontinuity at the threshold.
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The plots show that at the normalized threshold, tax rates for the two taxes increases
discontinuously. This observation implies that the average increase in tax rates at the
normalized threshold is larger in the post- than in the pre-treatment period. Consistent
with the evidence from the selection on observables approach, it appears that more per-
missive direct democratic institutions lead to higher tax rates. It is, however, difficult
to asses which of the two taxes increases the most as the raw discontinuities are not
comparable due to the different bases for each of the taxes, and associated exemptions
in the tax codes. We therefore discuss the relative coefficient sizes in the next section,
where we collect the diff-in-disc regression results.
4.2.2 Difference-in-Discontinuity Results
We present the baseline diff-in-disc regression results in Table 5. First, consistent with the
graphical evidence, we find evidence for a positive discontinuity for both tax rates when
we use a very small bandwidth, i. e. 1%. The effect is also significant at this bandwidth
for the property tax and the business tax rate. For larger bandwidths, however, the
estimates are only significant for the business tax multiplier.
Overall, therefore, we conclude that more lenient direct democratic legislation leads to
higher local tax rates. The relative size differences of the estimates also indicate that the
effect on the business tax rate is larger than on the property tax rate.
This last finding supports the evidence coming from the selection on observables ap-
proach, where the differences between the treatment effects for the business tax and the
property tax were quite substantial, too.
4.2.3 Robustness Checks
Control variables
Table 6 replicates the baseline results after accounting for those control variables already
considered in the selection on observables approach in Section 4.1. The conclusions do
not change, however. More lenient direct democratic institutions have a positive effect
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on tax rates, especially for smaller bandwidths. However, the estimates only remain sig-
nificant for larger bandwidths when we consider the business tax rate. In the regressions
with bandwidths larger than 2%, the size of the estimated beta is also noticeably larger
for the business than for the property tax rate.
Different polynomials
In Table 7, we study whether the results are robust to the use of different polynomials for
the control function. We report regressions with polynomial degrees from one up to five
(as indicated above, the benchmark regressions use a quartic polynomial). The estimates
are once more in line with the baseline results. For a very small bandwidth of 1%, we
find a consistently positive effect of more permissive direct democratic legislation on each
of the tax rates, irrespective of the polynomial’s degree. However, the coefficient is only
consistently positive for the business tax rate. The size of the beta is also typically larger
in the business tax regressions compared to the property tax regressions.
Placebo thresholds
In Table 8, we replicate the baseline regressions with placebo thresholds. The idea is
to study whether the observed discontinuities in local tax rates at the true normalized
threshold is only an artifact or whether they are indicative of a causal effect. If we were
to observe a significant effect at the fake thresholds, there is a chance that the effect in
the baseline regressions is indeed an artifact. If, on the other hand, the estimates at the
placebo thresholds are insignificant, it is likely that the observed effect in the baseline
regressions is causal.
We report results with three different fake thresholds, i. e. at 1000, 2000, and 5000
inhabitants. Reassuringly, the estimated coefficients are typically negative and insignifi-
cant. It is hence unlikely that the significant baseline estimates are only due to chance.
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Placebo years
In Table 9, we report a second set of placebo tests where we let the treatment start in
a fake year. More specifically, we split the sample into the pre- (1980-1994) and post-
treatment periods (1995-2011), and set the treatment date (wrongly) at 1990 and 2001,
respectively. We then re-run Equation 2.
For the regressions with the 1980-1994 subsample, we observe typically insignificant
effects. The exception is the property tax rate, where we observe a significantly negative
effect for two bandwidths. While we find a significant effect at this fake treatment year,
this cannot explain the significantly positive effect in the baseline regressions. In the 1995-
2011 subsample, as expected, we do not find any significant effects at the fake treatment
years.
4.2.4 Extensions
Individual thresholds
In Table 10, we report results where we explore the effect of individual thresholds rather
than studying all thresholds jointly. We find for the business tax rate a consistently posi-
tive and often significant effect. The only exception is at the 50,000 inhabitants thresholds
and when we use a bandwidth of 10%. However, treatment and control municipalities
might not be sufficiently comparable for such large bandwidths. In addition, sample sizes
are fairly small even for such large bandwidths for the 50,000 threshold, so that it is
possible that only a few outliers dominate the estimates
For the property tax, the treatment effect varies between thresholds. For the 10,000
inhabitants threshold, the treatment effect is consistently insignificant. For the 20,000
inhabitants threshold and for larger bandwidths, the treatment effect is significantly pos-
itive. For the 30,000 inhabitants thresholds, the treatment effect is significantly negative
when we employ a bandwidth of 5% , but insignificant for larger bandwidths. For the
50,000 inhabitants threshold, the treatment effect is significantly positive for 2% and 5%
bandwidths, but significantly negative at the 10% bandwidth. Again, the estimate for
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the 10% bandwidth might be biased due to the relatively large bandwidth, and simulta-
neously subject to the influence of outliers given the small sample size.
Second stage effects
In Table 11, we present TSLS results where rather than analyzing the reduced form ef-
fects of direct democratic legislation, we use the legislative rules to construct credible
instruments for direct democratic activity. The idea is that since the ease of launching an
initiative decreases in the signature requirements, we should observe more direct demo-
cratic activity in municipalities that have lower signature requirements. At the same time,
signature requirements are imposed by state law and thus, conditional on population size,
are quasi-exogenous.
Hence, we instrument in the models reported in Table 11 initiatives or referenda with
the signature requirements. As expected, in the first-stage (Panel C) we observe that
higher signature requirements reduce observed direct democratic activity.
In the second stage, we observe that both initiatives and referenda lead to significantly
higher business and property tax rates. The size of the coefficients for both initiatives
and referenda is consistently larger for the business tax than for the property tax.
Overall, these TSLS results that consistent with the RDD results. More permissive
direct democratic institution lead to an increase in local tax rates and a shift of the local
tax mix toward the business tax. What the TSLS model also show is that this effect,
at least to some extent, works through actual direct democratic activity. That is, the
effect seems to emerge not only because local officials implicitly comply more with the
median voter’s preferences when direct democratic institutions are more permissive and
thereby reducing the need for direct democratic activity, but also because initiatives and
referenda themselves lead to higher taxes.
19
5 Conclusion
We establish in this paper that direct democracy affects both the level and the mix of
local taxes. Both observed direct democratic activity and more lenient direct democratic
legislation result (i) in an increase of local tax rates and (ii) a relative shift to taxes with
narrower bases: from the property tax to the business tax.
These findings indicate that the preferences of (median) voters and legislators diverge.
Voters seem to prefer higher levels of taxes than legislators. In the German institutional
setting, and in contrast to evidence from countries such as Switzerland and the US, direct
democracy apparently leads to more redistributive taxation. Second, voters also seem to
prefer to tax narrower bases than legislators. In the German setting, this finding, too, is
plausible. The lion’s share of the business tax revenues is typically paid by a few large
firms. It is likely that these firms have a decisive influence on legislators’ tax policy,
both by being able to threaten to relocate plants and by co-opting key politicians by e. g.
supporting their election campaigns or sponsoring selected public (or private) projects.
By helping to align tax policies closer to the preferences of citizens, the expansion of
direct democracy may improve welfare, especially if the reason for low tax rates is that
legislators are being co-opted by economically powerful firms. On the other hand, it is
not clear whether voters are aware of the full costs of higher tax rates, in particular on
such narrow bases as business profits. That is, voters might not fully understand the
hidden costs of expanding taxes on business, i. e. increased outward and reduced inward
migration of firms and consequently lower employment opportunities. Given our result
that direct democracy leads to higher taxation on especially businesses, one task for
future work is to analyze whether these effects have undesirable economic consequences.
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Figure 1: Total number of initiatives in German La¨nder, 1956-2013
Bayern (1995)
Niedersachsen (1997)
Brandenburg (1992)
Hessen (1993)
Baden-Wuerttemberg (1956)
Nordrhein-Westfalen (1994)
Sachsen (1993)
Sachsen-Anhalt (1994)
Thueringen (1993)
Rheinland-Pfalz (1994)
Mecklenburg-Vorprommern (1993)
Schleswig-Holstein (1990)
Saarland (1999)
Berlin (2001)
Hamburg (1998)
Bremen (1996)
Bremen (1996)
Legend
Number of initiatives
- 50
50 - 250
250 - 500
500 - 1000
1000 - 2500
Notes: Total number of local-level initiatives per Land starting from 1956 (the year when two German La¨nder for the first
time adopted initiative legislation) to March, 2013. The year of first initiative (usually coincides with the year of adopting
initiative legislation) is in parentheses.
Figure 2: Annual number of initiatives and referenda in Bavarian towns, 1995-2011
Notes: Annual total local-level initiatives and referenda in all Bavarian municipalities. The initiative legislation was adopted
in October 1995 as a result of a state-wide referendum and was revised in April 1999, when additional quorum requirements
were introduced.
Table 1: Revenue structure of Bavarian municipalities in 2012
Revenue Category Euro, mln. Share, %
Tax Revenue 14,016 40.8%
Shared Taxes 6,186 44.1%
Autonomous Taxes 9,356 66.7%
Property Tax A 83 0.9%
Property Tax B 1,603 17.1%
Business Tax 7,620 81.4%
Apportionment from the Business Tax -1,526 -10.9%
General transfers 3,177 9.2%
User fees 2,384 6.9%
Contributions 475 1.4%
Other current revenues 6,630 19.3%
Investment grants 1,185 3.5%
Borrowing 1,185 3.4%
Other capital revenues 5,309 15.5%
Total Revenue 34,361 100.0%
Source: Own calculations based on data from Bayerisches Landesamt fu¨r Statistik und Datenverarbeitung
(2013).
Figure 3: Local diff-in-disc polynomial smooth of municipal tax rates around the nor-
malized threshold
(a) Property Tax Rate
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Notes: This figure shows diff-in-disc plots for the change in log property tax and log business tax rates at the normalized
threshold from the pre- to the post-treatment period. Observations are averaged within bins of size 0.01 in the scatter
plots. The polynomial plots are constructed with a rectangular kernel, a cubic degree, and a bandwidth of 0.5. The number
of observations within bins is used as frequency weights. We also plot 95% confidence intervals.
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Table 3: The effects of referenda on local tax rates
-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8
VARIABLE Property Tax Rate Business Tax Rate
Baseline Lag-0 Lag-1 Lag-2 Baseline Lag-0 Lag-1 Lag-2
Referendum 0.005*** 0.003 0.007*** 0.006**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
L1.Referendum 0.005** 0.008***
(0.002) (0.002)
L2.Referendum 0.007*** 0.011***
(0.003) (0.002)
Ln total population -0.808***-0.813***-0.811*** -0.777***-0.777***-0.779***
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Residential build. per km2 0.382*** 0.385*** 0.382*** 0.220** 0.213** 0.198*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Share of commercial area -0.013 -0.011 -0.009 -0.012 -0.011 -0.011
(0.299) (0.295) (0.293) (0.190) (0.188) (0.188)
Share of agricultural area -0.055** -0.056** -0.057** -0.037 -0.037 -0.036
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Share of mining area 0.026* 0.026* 0.026* 0.025 0.024 0.024
(0.375) (0.368) (0.365) (0.224) (0.220) (0.215)
Election year 0.287*** -0.034***-0.035*** 0.217*** -0.083***-0.084***
(0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Left share 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.000
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Right share -0.004 -0.005 -0.007 -0.029***-0.030***-0.031***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 78,752 78,656 76,204 73,752 78,752 78,656 76,204 73,752
R-squared 0.336 0.355 0.355 0.354 0.185 0.197 0.198 0.197
F 53.96 49.61 50.06 50.10 32.84 28.93 29.51 29.96
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Dependent variable is log Tax Rate specified for each row. Reported coefficients correspond to
the standardized beta. Columns 1-2 and 5-6 present results on the simultaneous relation between direct
democracy and the two tax rates without and with controls respectively, while each subsequent set of
two columns takes one additional backward lag of the direct democracy dummy. All regressions include
time and individual fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroscedasticity and
are two-way clustered at municipality-year and municipality-initiative levels.
Table 4: Signature and quorum requirements by population categories
Categories by Signature Quorum Average Tax Multiplier, % Obs.
Population Size Requirement Requirement Property-A Property-B Business
(1995) (1999)
% total pop. % eligible votes
0 <= Pop < 10,000 10% 20% 321.48 313.24 317.83 59329
10,000 <= Pop < 20,000 9% 20% 297.90 301.19 328.23 4567
20,000 <= Pop < 30,000 8% 20% 287.46 300.80 329.28 841
30,000 <= Pop < 50,000 7% 20% 264.70 309.20 339.66 504
50,000 <= Pop < 100,000 6% 15% 277.05 350.07 368.62 315
100,000 <= Pop < 500,000 5% 10% 310.71 393.11 425.21 236
500,000 < Pop 3% 10% 377.79 404.10 469.46 39
Source: Gemeindeordnung fu¨r den Freistaat Bayern (version: 24.07.2012).
Table 5: Diff-in-disc: the effect of direct democracy on local tax rates
Bandwidth: +/- 1% +/- 2% +/- 5% +/- 10% +/- 15%
Panel A: Property Tax Rate
Direct Democracy 0.385** 0.189 0.020 -0.023 -0.014
(0.078) (0.059) (0.033) (0.026) (0.024)
Observations 299 651 1,550 3,090 4,513
R-squared 0.272 0.217 0.143 0.137 0.141
F 60.74 4.252 5.786 7.093 8.449
Panel B: Business Tax Rate
Direct Democracy 0.436* 0.356** 0.189** 0.121* 0.086
(0.057) (0.037) (0.018) (0.014) (0.013)
Observations 299 651 1,550 3,090 4,513
R-squared 0.203 0.107 0.064 0.051 0.054
F 182.0 4.069 4.022 3.167 3.731
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Dependent variable is log Tax Rate specified for each panel. Reported coefficients correspond
to the standardized beta. Direct democracy is the interaction term between the the Treatment Dummy
(equaling 0 for observations within the lower bandwidth of the population thresholds, and 1 within the
upper bandwidth) and the 1995 Dummy (equaling 1 for the years 1995 and above, and 0 otherwise).
Population size of up to the fourth polynomial is included as a control separately for the two sides of
the threshold (coefficients not reported). All regressions include time fixed effects. Standard errors are
robust to heteroscedasticity and are clustered at municipality level.
Table 6: Diff-in-disc: the effect of direct democracy on local tax rates controlling for
covariates
Bandwidth: +/- 1% +/- 2% +/- 5% +/- 10% +/- 15%
Panel A: Property Tax Rate
Direct democracy 0.385** 0.134 -0.010 -0.053 -0.024
(0.072) (0.056) (0.032) (0.024) (0.023)
Observations 299 651 1,550 3,090 4,513
R-squared 0.467 0.333 0.229 0.226 0.219
F 582.0 7.170 5.774 5.974 7.661
Panel B: Business Tax Rate
Direct democracy 0.337* 0.255* 0.158** 0.088 0.082
(0.048) (0.032) (0.017) (0.013) (0.012)
Observations 299 651 1,550 3,090 4,513
R-squared 0.355 0.348 0.240 0.222 0.189
F 35.33 5.846 2.701 3.637 4.103
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Dependent variable is log Tax Rate specified for each panel. Reported coefficients correspond
to the standardized beta. Direct democracy is the interaction term between the the Treatment Dummy
(equaling 0 for observations within the lower bandwidth of the population thresholds, and 1 within the
upper bandwidth) and the 1995 Dummy (equaling 1 for the years 1995 and above, and 0 otherwise).
Population size of up to the fourth polynomial is included as a control separately for the two sides of
the threshold (coefficients not reported). All regressions include time fixed effects. A full set of control
variables as specified in Equation 1 is included in all regression(results not reported). Standard errors
are robust to heteroscedasticity and are clustered at municipality level.
Table 7: Diff-in-disc: the effect of direct democracy on local tax rates with different
population polynomials
Bandwidth: +/- 1% +/- 2% +/- 5% +/- 10% +/- 15%
First Polynomial
Property Tax 0.440** 0.220 0.021 -0.029 -0.017
(0.074) (0.058) (0.033) (0.026) (0.024)
Business Tax 0.405* 0.332** 0.184** 0.119* 0.085
(0.054) (0.037) (0.018) (0.014) (0.013)
Observations 299 651 1,550 3,090 4,513
Second Polynomial
Property Tax 0.482*** 0.223 0.029 -0.023 -0.015
(0.074) (0.058) (0.033) (0.026) (0.024)
Business Tax 0.439* 0.340** 0.182** 0.120* 0.086
(0.056) (0.037) (0.018) (0.014) (0.013)
Observations 299 651 1,550 3,090 4,513
Third Polynomial
Property Tax 0.474*** 0.229 0.024 -0.023 -0.014
(0.076) (0.059) (0.033) (0.026) (0.024)
Business Tax 0.446* 0.363** 0.187** 0.122* 0.086
(0.056) (0.037) (0.018) (0.014) (0.013)
Observations 299 651 1,550 3,090 4,513
Fourth Polynomial (benchmark)
Property Tax 0.385** 0.189 0.020 -0.023 -0.014
(0.078) (0.059) (0.033) (0.026) (0.024)
Business Tax 0.436* 0.356** 0.189** 0.121* 0.086
(0.057) (0.037) (0.018) (0.014) (0.013)
Observations 299 651 1,550 3,090 4,513
Fifth Polynomial
Property Tax 0.350* 0.19 0.024 -0.022 -0.016
-0.08 -0.059 -0.033 -0.026 -0.024
Business Tax 0.414* 0.356** 0.196** 0.124* 0.086
-0.058 -0.037 -0.018 -0.014 -0.013
Observations 299 651 1,550 3,090 4,513
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Table presents regressions for up to the fifth polynomial of (normalized) population size specified
for each panel. Dependent variable is log Tax Rate specified for each row. Reported coefficients corre-
spond to the standardized beta. Direct democracy is the interaction term between the the Treatment
Dummy (equaling 0 for observations within the lower bandwidth of the population thresholds, and 1
within the upper bandwidth) and the 1995 Dummy (equaling 1 for the years 1995 and above, and 0
otherwise). All regressions include time fixed effects. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity
and are clustered at municipality level.
Table 8: Diff-in-disc: the effect of placebo thresholds on local tax rates
Bandwidth: +/- 1% +/- 2% +/- 5% +/- 10% +/- 15%
Panel A: 1 Thousand
Property Tax -0.0405 -0.0174 -0.0014 0.0101 0.00637
Business Tax 0.00256 0.0273 0.0297* 0.0067 0.0078
Observations 370 854 2,416 4,668 6,931
Panel B: 2 Thousand
Property Tax -0.0542 -0.0858* -0.030 0.0038 -0.0021
Business Tax -0.0341 -0.0251 -0.0117 -0.0031 0.00262
Observations 620 1,200 2,882 5,759 8,721
Panel C: 5 Thousand
Property Tax -0.0569 -0.0186 -0.0158 0.00998 0.00393
Business Tax 0.00323 -0.003 -0.0131 -0.007 -0.006
Observations 466 873 2,057 4,080 5,862
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Table presents regressions for placebo thresholds at 1-, 2- and 5- thousand in each panel. Depen-
dent variable is log Tax Rate specified for each row. Reported coefficients correspond to the standardized
beta. Direct democracy is the interaction term between the the Treatment Dummy (equaling 0 for ob-
servations within the lower bandwidth of the population thresholds, and 1 within the upper bandwidth)
and the 1995 Dummy (equaling 1 for the years 1995 and above, and 0 otherwise). Population size of up
to the third polynomial is included as a control separately for the two sides of the threshold (coefficients
not reported). All regressions include time fixed effects. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity
and are clustered at municipality level.
Table 9: Diff-in-disc: the effect of population thresholds on local tax rates with placebo
years
Bandwidth: +/- 1% +/- 2% +/- 5% +/- 10% +/- 15%
Panel A: Placebo year 1990
Sample: 1980-1994
Property Tax -0.0236 -0.153** -0.111* -0.0238 -0.0156
Business Tax 0.12 0.0061 0.0102 0.0184 0.0273
Observations 153 299 756 1,407 2,034
Panel B: Placebo year 2001
Sample: 1995-2011
Property Tax 0.0322 0.0412 0.0412 0.00245 -0.0073
Business Tax 0.0149 0.00121 0.0343 -0.0047 -0.008
Observations 146 352 794 1,683 2,479
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Table presents regressions for placebo years of 1990 and 2001 in each panel. Dependent variable
is log Tax Rate specified for each row. Reported coefficients correspond to the standardized beta. Direct
democracy is the interaction term between the the Treatment Dummy (equaling 0 for observations
within the lower bandwidth of the population thresholds, and 1 within the upper bandwidth) and the
1995 Dummy (equaling 1 for the years 1995 and above, and 0 otherwise). Population size of up to the
third polynomial is included as a control separately for the two sides of the threshold (coefficients not
reported). All regressions include time fixed effects. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and
are clustered at municipality level.
Table 10: Diff-in-disc: the effect of direct democracy on local tax rates on some of the
thresholds separately
Bandwidth: +/- 1% +/- 2% +/- 5% +/- 10% +/- 15%
Panel A: 10 Thousand
Property Tax 0.302 0.155 -0.021 -0.157 -0.125
(0.085) (0.068) (0.042) (0.038) (0.032)
Business Tax 0.646** 0.435** 0.214* 0.033 0.054
(0.059) (0.034) (0.019) (0.017) (0.015)
Observations 210 388 948 1,868 2,780
Panel B: 20 Thousand
Property Tax 0.054 -0.006 0.233** 0.199*
(0.066) (0.064) (0.038) (0.039)
Business Tax 0.374*** 0.369 0.446** 0.369**
(0.034) (0.051) (0.029) (0.030)
Observations 57 139 346 768 1,054
Panel C: 30 Thousand
Property Tax -0.284*** -0.011 0.083
(0.017) (0.032) (0.031)
Business Tax 0.085** 0.248 0.221
(0.003) (0.025) (0.027)
Observations 6 26 86 216 313
Panel D: 50 Thousand
Property Tax 0.779*** 0.717*** -0.690*** 0.162
(0.001) (0.004) (0.053) (0.047)
Business Tax 0.655*** 0.594*** -0.491** -0.278
(0.002) (0.004) (0.027) (0.038)
Observations 6 38 90 142 248
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Table presents regressions for the 10-, 20-, 30-, and 50- thousand population thresholds separately
in each panel. Dependent variable is log Tax Rate specified for each row. Reported coefficients correspond
to the standardized beta. Direct democracy is the interaction term between the the Treatment Dummy
(equaling 0 for observations within the lower bandwidth of the population thresholds, and 1 within the
upper bandwidth) and the 1995 Dummy (equaling 1 for the years 1995 and above, and 0 otherwise).
Population size of up to the fourth polynomial is included as a control separately for the two sides of
the threshold (coefficients not reported). All regressions include time fixed effects. Standard errors are
robust to heteroscedasticity and are clustered at municipality level.
Table 11: TSLS: The effects of referenda on local tax rates (reduced-form results)
-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6
Lag 0 Lag 1 Lag 2
Panel A: Property Tax Rate
Initiative 2.496*** 2.783*** 2.620***
(0.513) (0.622) (0.533)
Referendum 4.848** 5.496** 4.893**
(1.924) (2.293) (1.973)
Panel B: Business Tax Rate
Initiative 2.731*** 3.051*** 2.881***
(0.313) (0.385) (0.33)0
Referendum 5.306** 6.026* 5.381*
(1.243) (1.503) (1.301)
Panel C: First-Stage Results:
Signature Requirement -0.101*** -0.040** -0.113*** -0.055*** -0.109*** -0.069***
(0.535) (0.331) (0.582) (0.358) (0.580) (0.413)
Observations 41,832 41,832 39,376 39,376 36,915 36,915
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The table presents Two Stage Least Squares estimates of Equations 1, where the direct democracy
dummies, R, are instrumented on signature requirement (controlling fro quorum requirements and all
other regressors). Dependent variable is log property and business tax rate in panels A and B respectively.
First-stage results are presented in Panel C, where the dependent variable is the direct democracy
dummy. Reported coefficients correspond to the standardized beta. Columns 1-2 present results on the
simultaneous relation between tax rate and the two alternative definitions of direct democracy, while each
subsequent set of two columns takes one additional backward lag of the direct democracy dummies. All
regressions include time and county fixed effects. A full set of control variables as specified in Equation
1 is included in all regression(results not reported). Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and
are clustered at county levels.
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